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Abstract

Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation was a gamble. If it were to succeed, it could cripple the economy of the
South, decimating its war effort, drive the border states to accept compensated emancipation, ending slavery
as an institution in the United States, and accelerate the end of the war, ensuring the endurance of the United
States of America. If it were to fail, it could spur the border states to secede, galvanizing the South, render
Abraham Lincoln a political pariah with two years remaining in his term, deflating the North, and encourage
European states to broker a two-state solution in North America, sending the concept of the American
republic to the history books as a failed experiment. Lincoln appreciated these high stakes as he methodically
built the case for emancipation during the first two years of his presidency, drawing on his decades of
experience in Illinois courthouses to develop what would be the most consequential legal argument he would
ever have to make. That Lincoln had long thought slavery was a moral wrong was insufficient justification to
decree its demise; he had to build a case that could withstand scrutiny from an adversarial federal court system
and avoid a legal challenge until after the war, when he could pursue the permanent recourse available only
through a constitutional amendment. This paper explores the legal and political arguments Lincoln and his
critics proffered and weighs the constitutionality of the Emancipation Proclamation.
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Destroying the Right Arm of Rebellion: Lincoln’s
Emancipation Proclamation
By Benjamin Pontz
The Emancipation Proclamation was a gamble. If it were to
succeed, it could cripple the economy of the South, decimating its war
effort, drive the border states to accept compensated emancipation,
ending slavery as an institution in the United States, and accelerate the
end of the war, ensuring the endurance of the United States of America.
If it were to fail, it could spur the border states to secede, galvanizing
the South, render Abraham Lincoln a political pariah with two years
remaining in his term, deflating the North, and encourage European
states to broker a two-state solution in North America, sending the
concept of the American republic to the history books as a failed
experiment. Lincoln appreciated these high stakes as he methodically
built the case for emancipation during the first two years of his
presidency, drawing on his decades of experience in Illinois
courthouses to develop what would be the most consequential legal
argument he would ever have to make. That Lincoln had long thought
slavery was a moral wrong was insufficient justification to decree its
demise; he had to build a case that could withstand scrutiny from an
adversarial federal court system and avoid a legal challenge until after
the war, when he could pursue the permanent recourse available only
through a constitutional amendment.
In building that legal case, Lincoln relied upon the notion of
military necessity, arguing that the Constitution vested in the president
war powers that enabled him to subdue an enemy using means that
extend beyond the peacetime confines of Article II’s authority. Almost
immediately upon issuing the proclamation, Lincoln faced a panoply
of criticism from radical Republicans who thought he had not gone far
30

enough, congressmen who thought he had seized their (or their states’)
rightful prerogatives, and legal scholars who thought the war powers
he cited were totally fabricated and patently unconstitutional. In the
years since, Lincoln has drawn criticism that the dense legalese in the
proclamation’s text demonstrates a reluctance to actually free slaves,
that he deliberately obfuscated the proclamation’s legal status to dodge
legal scrutiny, and that he exercised an extraconstitutional power grab
that amounted to the same tyranny Americans once fled in Britain.
Each of these critiques has a rational basis, but each fails to appreciate
the president’s ultimate obligation to preserve, protect, and defend the
United States Constitution. The proclamation was Lincoln’s final move
after his attempts to secure gradual, compensated emancipation failed
and the Union’s prospects on the battlefield looked bleak. Therefore,
having exhausted all other options, Lincoln developed the
Emancipation Proclamation with meticulous attention to the
Constitution so that he could continue his endeavor to secure slaves’
ultimate freedom upon winning the war and saving the Union.
The question of how to handle slaves that reached Union-held
territory presented itself almost immediately at the outset of the war.
On May 23, 1861, three slaves who were property of Confederate
Colonel Charles Mallory presented themselves to Union troops at
Fortress Monroe. Major General Benjamin Butler, a lawyer, reasoned
that these slaves were effectively Confederate property being used in
the war effort, and, according to international law, could be considered
“contraband” and seized accordingly. That is exactly what Butler did,
and the War Department approved of his action, which simultaneously
deprived the enemy of labor and provided that labor to the Union
Army. That August, Congress approved of Butler’s policy by passing
the Confiscation Act of 1861, which Lincoln, fearful of its
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constitutional ramifications as well as its potential effect on the border
states, reluctantly signed.1
Later that month, Maj. Gen. John Fremont declared martial law
in St. Louis and then the entire state of Missouri amid Confederate rebel
activity that created a “desperate military and political situation.” In his
declaration, he claimed the right to confiscate all property – including
slaves – of anyone who had taken the rebels’ side in the war. The
proclamation sparked an outcry in both the Unionist and southern
rights press from Missouri to Kentucky, and, on September 11, Lincoln
ordered Fremont to change the act to comply with the Confiscation Act
“in relation to the confiscation of property and the liberation of slaves.”
Lincoln later fired Fremont, but, in a letter to Senator Orville
Browning, said military emancipation could potentially be authorized
by Congress and that Fremont could even have seized slaves
temporarily but lacked the power to do so permanently by military
proclamation. That was a job for lawmakers, not the military.2
Further south, on May 9, 1862, Maj. Gen. David Hunter issued
General Order 11, which declared slaves in South Carolina, Georgia,
and Florida – states in rebellion who had thus opened themselves to
martial law as militarily necessary – forever free. He also sought to
enlist black men into the Union Army. Similar to his response in
Missouri, Lincoln immediately recognized the political and legal
ramifications of such an order, and he rescinded it on May 19. Perhaps
Benjamin Butler, Butler’s Book (Boston, 1892), 256-257; Butler to Lt. Gen.
Winfield Scott, May 24-27, 1861, O.R., ser. 2, vol. 1, 752-754; Simon Cameron
to Butler, May 30, 1861, O.R., ser. 2, vol. 1, 754-755; “An Act Used to
Confiscate Property Used for Insurrectionary Purposes,” Aug. 6, 1861, 12 Stat.
319 (1863).
2
William Harris, Lincoln and the Border States: Preserving the Union
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2011), 98-102; Proclamation of
Fremont, Aug. 30, 1861, O.R., ser. 1, vol. 1, 466-467; Lincoln to Fremont, Sep.
11, 1861, Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, (Roy Basler, ed. New
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press), 4: 517-518; Lincoln to
Browning, Sep. 22, 1861, C.W., vol. 4, 531-532.
1
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foreshadowing his own actions to come, he added that only the
president could determine such an act a military necessity: “[Such
power] I reserve to myself, and which I cannot feel justified in leaving
to the decision of commanders in the field.” Even so, Union generals
from Missouri all the way to the Gulf sought to impress upon Lincoln
the military necessity of emancipation throughout the early part of
1862. Lincoln recognized, however, that a piecemeal approach to
emancipation driven by commanders in the field would neither be
politically nor legally feasible and that the Confiscation Act, too, was
legally tenuous. As such, he focused on building support in the political
arena for a more stable solution.3
From the beginning, it was clear that Lincoln would endeavor
to act within the bounds of the law in how he managed the war, and his
policy towards slaves was no exception. Although Lincoln was
personally opposed to slavery, a subject he had discussed at length
during the 1858 Lincoln-Douglas debates and would note again in a
famous letter to Horace Greeley in August 1862 stating his “oftexpressed personal wish that all men every where [sic] could be free,”
personal misgivings could not justify a national policy of blanket
emancipation. Particularly (though not exclusively) in the border states,
Lincoln instead promulgated gradual, compensated emancipation,
which, in his estimation, was cheaper than ongoing execution of the
war, was clearly constitutional, and would cripple an insurrection
predicated on winning the allegiance of border states to protect slavery.
While legislators such as John Crittenden of Kentucky, who argued that
slavery was a state institution, resented federal meddling in slavery,
3

Proclamation by Abraham Lincoln, May 19, 1862, Presidential Proclamations,
Series 23, Record Group 11, National Archives; Kristopher Teters, Practical
Liberators: Union Officers in the Western Theater during the Civil War (Chapel
Hill, North Carolina: North Carolina University Press, 2018), 36-41; David
Livingstone, “The Emancipation Proclamation, the Declaration of
Independence, and the Presidency: Lincoln’s Model of Statesmanship,”
Perspectives on Political Science 28 (1999): 206-207.
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many expressed openness to the proposal provided the compensation
was sufficient. Lincoln had high hopes throughout late 1861 and early
1862 that his scheme would find supporters. Such hope soon
evaporated. With the passage of a bill ending slavery in Washington
D.C. in April, Hunter’s emancipation endeavor in May, and the passage
of the Confiscation Act of 1862, which opened the door to federal
emancipation, in July, border state opposition hardened. After Lincoln
had convened a delegation of border state congressmen to make a final
appeal, they replied in a majority report on July 13, “Our people … will
not consider the proposition in its present impalpable form.”
Disapproval from border state congressmen along with a growing
sense of military urgency after Lincoln reviewed the Army of the
Potomac at Harrison’s Landing spurred him to begin work on a more
sweeping solution.4
That approach became known as the Emancipation
Proclamation. His sense of military exigency heightened after General
George McClellan had used the word “capitulate” in connection to the
Army of the Potomac’s fate absent more reinforcements, Lincoln set to
work on a first draft of the proclamation. “I felt that we had reached the
end of our rope on the plan of operations we had been pursuing; that
we had about played our last card, and must change our tactics, or lose
the game,” Lincoln later wrote of his decision to begin formulating a
new plan for emancipation. In an 1899 McClure’s Magazine article,
4

Lincoln, Letter to Horace Greeley, August 22, 1862, in The Emancipation
Proclamation: A Brief History with Documents, Michael Vorenberg, ed.
(Boston: St. Martin’s Press, 2010), 58; Harris, Lincoln and the Border States,
161-162, 179-182; Don Fehrenbacher, Prelude to Greatness: Lincoln in the
1850s (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), 75-79; Border State
Congressmen to Lincoln, Jul. 14, 1862, Lincoln Papers, ser. 1, Library of
Congress; Brian Danoff, “Lincoln and the ‘Necessity’ of Tolerating Slavery
Before the Civil War,” Review of Politics 77 (2015): 69; Speech of John J.
Crittenden, of Kentucky, on emancipation, Mar. 11, 1862, in Slavery Source
Material and Critical Literature (Louisville, Kentucky: Lost Cause Press, 1977),
microfiche.
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Ida Tarbell observed, “Lincoln never came to a point in his public
career where he did not have a card in reserve, and he never lacked the
courage to play it if he was forced to.” His military on the ropes and
talking of surrender, Lincoln had no choice but to move to the final
card in his hand. As William Harris wrote,
The huge and demoralizing losses suffered by General McClellan
in the ill-fated June 1862 Peninsula campaign to take Richmond
brought intense pressure from Republicans for the president to take
more vigorous measures against the rebels. Lincoln’s view of
southern resistance also hardened, which increased his
determination to find legal authority to move against slavery in the
insurrectionary states.

On July 13, 1862, he discussed the potential proclamation with
Secretary of State William Seward and Navy Secretary Gideon Welles,
emphasizing the notion of military necessity as the legal justification
for such an edict. Having signed – again with reluctance – the
Confiscation Act of 1862 on July 17, Lincoln framed his draft
Emancipation Proclamation pursuant to section six of that act, which
required the president to issue a proclamation enabling seizure of rebel
property. He presented the draft to his cabinet on July 22. It found
general, though not unanimous, agreement. Seward advised waiting
until a military victory so the proclamation would not look desperate,
and Lincoln agreed.5

5

William Klingman, Abraham Lincoln and the Road to Emancipation, 18611865 (New York: Viking, 2001), 139-140, 157-158; Ida Tarbell, “Lincoln and
the Emancipation Proclamation,” McClure’s Magazine 12 (1899): 514; Harris,
Lincoln and the Border States, 189; Gideon Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles,
Secretary of the Navy under Lincoln and Johnson, ed. John Torrey Morse (New
York: Houghton Mifflin, 1911), vol. 1, 70; “An Act to suppress Insurrection, to
punish Treason and Rebellion, to seize and confiscate the Property of Rebels,
and for other Purposes,” U.S., Statutes at Large, Treaties, and Proclamations of
the United States of America, vol. 12 (Boston, 1863), 589-592; Preliminary
Draft of Emancipation Proclamation, Jul. 22, 1862, Lincoln Papers, ser. 1,
Library of Congress.
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Lincoln found that victory, such as it was, in the Battle of
Antietam on September 17. On September 22, Lincoln issued the
preliminary version of the Emancipation Proclamation. Notably, this
was just weeks before the midterm elections. Lincoln had long taken
what Fehrenbacher has called an “extreme” view that the people –
through their voice at the ballot box – are the ultimate arbiters of what
is constitutional. If the people’s initial utterance was any indication,
they had concerns. Republicans lost 31 seats in the House as well as
several important governorships in the fall of 1862. Although Lincoln
never admitted this was a result of the preliminary proclamation – and,
certainly, other factors such as rising inflation, high taxes, imposition
of conscription, and the general malaise of a long war likely played a
role – the people’s initial feedback was hardly resounding support.
When Congress reconvened in December, Lincoln made a final
attempt to rekindle gradual, compensated emancipation in his annual
address, but the proposal was defeated by both radicals on the left and
pro-slavery factions on the right. Lincoln, therefore, spent the week
after Christmas putting the finishing touches on his proclamation,
carefully exempting Union-held territories in the South to ensure his
argument of military necessity remained sound despite protest from
Secretary of the Treasury Salmon Chase that doing so would create
administrative nightmares. Lincoln was careful not to overstep his
constitutional bounds, and the exemptions stood. He signed the
proclamation on January 1, 1863.6
In the constitutional debate that surrounded the issue of
emancipation, Lincoln proved to be his own best advocate.
6

Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, Sep. 22, 1862, Lincoln Papers, ser. 1,
Library of Congress; Don Fehrenbacher, “Lincoln and the Constitution,” in The
Public and Private Lincoln, Cullom Davis et al., eds. (Carbondale, Illinois:
Southern Illinois University Press, 1979), 134; Klingman, Lincoln and the Road
to Emancipation, 205-207, 228-229; Harris, Lincoln and the Border States, 204205; Emancipation Proclamation, Jan. 1, 1862, Lincoln Papers, ser. 1, Library of
Congress.
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Fundamentally, Lincoln’s argument rested on the idea that the president
had inherent war powers that he could exercise when militarily necessary
on issues beyond the reach of Congress or the peacetime executive
power. Emancipation was one such issue. Crucially, however, it was not
the only one. As Fehrenbacher noted,
[Lincoln] responded to the attack on Fort Sumter by enlarging the
army, proclaiming a blockade of Southern ports, suspending the writ
of habeas corpus in certain areas, authorizing arbitrary arrests and
imprisonments on a large scale, and spending public funds without
legal warrant. He never yielded the initiative seized at this time.

That emancipation was another area that required executive initiative
was not a unanimous legal opinion; while even most Radical
Republicans conceded that ending slavery was beyond the scope of the
legislative power, Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner, for one,
argued in 1864 that Congress had always had the power to regulate
slavery by simple statute as “commerce among the states.” For Lincoln,
however, military necessity put this issue squarely within the sphere of a
wartime executive power. Since the outset of the war, many Union
officers had gradually come to see the fruits of emancipating slaves
within enemy territory as militarily advantageous and had urged Lincoln
to consider a broader regime to assist them in the field. That was the aim
of this wartime emancipation.7
Relying on the notion that Article II’s commander-in-chief
clause necessarily vested the president with war powers with which to
preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution, Lincoln felt he had the
authority to subdue the rebellion in states that had removed themselves
from the civil law regime that had put slavery in the states beyond the
reach of the federal government. In a public letter to James Conkling,

Fehrenbacher, “Lincoln and the Constitution,” 127; “Universal Emancipation
Without Compensation,” Speech by Charles Sumner, Apr. 8, 1864, in Slavery
Source Material and Critical Literature (Louisville, Kentucky: Lost Cause Press,
1977), microfiche; Teters, Practical Liberators, 41.
7
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Lincoln wrote, “I think the constitution invests its commander-in-chief,
with the law of war, in time of war. … Is there--has there ever been--any
question that by the law of war, property, both of enemies and friends,
may be taken when needed? And is it not needed whenever taking it,
helps us, or hurts the enemy?” During wartime, this assertion put the
proclamation beyond the reach of the federal courts, but Lincoln
acknowledged that war powers end when war ends. As such, he freely
admitted that the courts would rule on the proclamation after the war and
that such a ruling may not be favorable to the permanence of
emancipation particularly given the presence atop the Supreme Court of
Roger Taney, author of the Dred Scott opinion. In July 1863, Lincoln
said in a letter to Stephen Hurlbut, “I think it is valid in law, and will be
so held by the courts.” Two months later, Congressman-Elect Green
Clay Smith of Kentucky asked Lincoln to affirm the right of “repentant
rebels” in the border states to redress grievances arising from the
Emancipation Proclamation in civil courts. Lincoln replied that he was
“perfectly willing” to allow the Courts to have their say at the appropriate
time and pledged to “abide by judicial decisions when made.” Cognizant
that the courts likely would not uphold a proclamation rooted in an
argument of military necessity after the war, Lincoln acknowledged the
need for a constitutional amendment to permanently end slavery. The
13th Amendment would come to be what Lincoln called a “king’s cure
for all evils.”8
In the years since Lincoln made his constitutional case for
emancipation, some scholars have concluded either that he was not
confident in the case he had made and sought an opportunity to escape
the situation or that he deliberately obfuscated the constitutional
arguments to sow confusion. Neither argument seems to fully hit the
mark. The first, proffered by Barry Schwartz, is predicated on the notion
8

Lincoln to Conkling, Aug. 26, 1863, C.W. vol. 6, 407-409; Lincoln to Hurlbut,
Jul. 31, 1863, C.W. vol. 6, 359; “An Amnesty Suggested,” New York Times, Sep.
10, 1863, 5; Response to a Serenade, Feb. 1, 1865, C.W. vol. 8, 255.
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that, were the Confederacy to agree to rejoin the Union in exchange for
rescinding the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln would have readily
acquiesced. “Lincoln probably feigned his uncertainty over the postwar
status of the proclamation,” Schwartz writes. “The prospect for an
abolition amendment aside, he knew the restoration of the prewar
Constitution was certain when the war ended.” Schwartz contends that
Lincoln vacillated on the end of emancipation; what appears more likely
is that Lincoln vacillated, or, more accurately, evolved, on the means to
end slavery. Harold Holzer’s thinking is in a similar vein to Schwartz’s,
though Holzer contends Lincoln was deliberately inconsistent and
ambiguous in his framing of emancipation. In Holzer’s view, the
“microscopic precision” with which the proclamation was crafted to
avoid legal challenges had an ulterior motive: to avoid inflaming
passions that would cause political problems and give Lincoln an
opportunity to “spin” the proclamation in the media. It is certainly the
case that Lincoln’s legal argument for emancipation evolved from his
early plans for compensated gradualism to the ultimate proclamation, but
that is more evident of the changing conditions on the ground and an
earnest desire to comply with the Constitution than any cold-footed
apprehension or nefarious manipulation. In sum, Lincoln’s constitutional
argument for the proclamation he issued was tightly rooted in his power
as commander-in-chief.9
Other constitutional arguments in support of the Emancipation
Proclamation meandered onto more tenuous legal ground. In a pamphlet
responding to charges that Lincoln’s assertion of war powers was
antithetical to constitutional principles, Grosvenor Lowrey responded
that, in subduing “rebellious communities,” the president can free slaves,
but he conceded that such power is extraconstitutional. “The military
Barry Schwartz, “The Emancipation Proclamation: Lincoln’s Many Second
Thoughts,” Society 52 (2015): 594; Harold Holzer, Emancipating Lincoln: The
Proclamation in Text, Context, and Memory (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2012), 93-94.
9
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power suspends, but never destroys the law. Inter arma silent [in the
midst of war, the law is silent],” he wrote. Others contended that exacting
vengeance justified emancipation. Before a raucous crowd at Boston’s
Emancipation League in 1861, former Massachusetts Governor and
future congressman George Boutwell argued that the president should
pursue military emancipation as a matter of military necessity, but that,
regardless, the South had ceded its right to constitutional protection.
“The rebels have no right to complain,” he said, to thunderous applause.
Such a punitive argument could, however, have been used to construe
the Emancipation Proclamation as a bill of attainder, which the
Constitution expressly forbids. While William Whiting, the War
Department’s solicitor, had issued a pamphlet arguing that nothing in the
Emancipation Proclamation could be so construed because bills of
attainder had been punishable only by death in Britain, not seizure of
property, that argument was certainly weaker than the notion that slaves
could be freed since they were helping the Confederacy’s war effort.10
A handful of arguments did buttress Lincoln’s claim that
emancipation was a military necessity that the commander-in-chief
power justified. Sumner, an ardent abolitionist, had long been motivated
by the moral arguments against slavery, but he also trumpeted the
practical advantages of emancipation in a speech at Boston’s Faneuil
Hall in October 1862, arguing that freed slaves could enlist in the Union
Army. Perhaps a rhetorical flourish, but one he repeated again in
10

Grosvenor Lowrey, The Commander-in-Chief: A Defence upon Legal
Grounds of the Proclamation of Emancipation, (New York, 1863), quoted in
Union Pamphlets of the Civil War, 1861-1865, Frank Feidel, ed. (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1967); “Emancipation: Its Justice, Expediency and
Necessity, As the Means of Securing a Speedy and Permanent Peace,” speech by
George Boutwell, Dec. 16, 1861, in Slavery Source Material and Critical
Literature (Louisville: Lost Cause Press, 1977), microfiche; Henry Chambers,
“Lincoln, the Emancipation Proclamation, and Executive Power,” Maryland
Law Review 73 (2013): 125-126; William Whiting, The War Powers of the
President and the Legislative Powers of Congress in Relation to Rebellion,
Treason, and Slavery (Boston: Rand & Avery, 1873), 92.
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February 1863 and April 1864, Sumner added, “There is no blow which
the President can strike, there is nothing he can do against the rebellion,
which is not constitutional. Only inaction can be unconstitutional.”
Sumner’s fellow Bay Stater Edward Everett incorporated international
law in his defense of the Emancipation Proclamation, writing, “Who can
suppose it is the duty of the United States to continue to recognize
[slavery]” when states are in rebellion since the institution finds no basis
in the law of nations nor in natural law. The potential for an international
intervention in the Civil War was something Lincoln considered as he
weighed issuing the proclamation, but he ultimately thought the
proclamation would not have a substantial effect either way. Indeed,
other events in Europe did more to dissuade a brokered peace settlement
than the Emancipation Proclamation. Perhaps the most full-throated
defense of the proclamation aside from Lincoln came in Whiting’s
aforementioned pamphlet. Whiting contended that the Constitution is
designed to create a perpetual republic and that, therefore, it must grant
the president sufficient war powers to preserve that republic regardless
of whether the war has been formally declared (which this one had not
so as to avoid legitimizing southern secession). Significantly, Whiting
quoted the 1827 court decision Martin v. Mott, which concluded that “the
authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen belongs exclusively
to the President, and that this decision is conclusive upon all other
persons.” While that case dealt specifically with the president’s power to
call up militias to suppress rebellion, it lent credence to Lincoln’s
contention that the Constitution had vested certain war powers in the
president to use when militarily necessary. Overall, arguments in support
of the proclamation were often more spirited than Lincoln’s, but they
were less tight, a fact on which the proclamation’s opponents seized.11
11

Charles Sumner, Emancipation! Its Policy and Necessity as a War Measure
for Suppression of the Rebellion, Oct. 6, 1862, (Boston, 1862); “Immediate
Emancipation as a War Measure!” Speech by Charles Sumner, Feb. 12, 1863, in
Slavery Source Material and Critical Literature (Louisville, Kentucky: Lost

41

Among the sharpest critics of the Emancipation Proclamation
was Harvard Law Professor Joel Parker. At the core of Parker’s
objection lay the notion of ostensibly unlimited war powers, which the
president could use to defend any action in the name of military
necessity. Emancipation was not, in Parker’s view, a legitimate response
to a military exigency, but an executive power grab that threatened the
constitutional order. He wrote,
There is nothing in the colonial or revolutionary history, or in the
history of the adoption of the State constitutions, or in the adoption
of the Constitution of the United States, which can for a moment
sustain the assumption of any such war powers, either by Congress
or by the President. And there is nothing material to the suppression
of the rebellion, which may not be accomplished without the
assumption of such a construction of the Constitution.

After excoriating Whiting for promulgating “bad law, and, if possible,
worse logic,” Parker concluded that the Constitution granted sufficient
power to the executive and legislative branches to suppress a rebellion:
laws against conspiracy and sedition, for example, are constitutional;
presidential proclamations seizing property without any semblance of
due process, however, are not.12
Notably, two years earlier, Parker had defended the Lincoln
administration’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and condemned
Taney’s dictum in Ex parte Merryman, which said that the president had
no constitutional authority to suspend the writ. Parker acknowledged
that, in times of war, “The military law must be held to supersede the
Cause Press, 1977), microfiche; “Universal Emancipation Without
Compensation,” Speech by Charles Sumner, Apr. 8, 1864, in Slavery Source
Material and Critical Literature (Louisville, Kentucky: Lost Cause Press, 1977),
microfiche; “Everett on Emancipation,” Chicago Tribune, Oct. 27, 1864, 2; Don
Doyle, The Cause of All Nations: An International History of the Civil War,
(New York: Basic Books, 2015), 220; Whiting, War Powers, 66-67; Martin v.
Mott, 25 U.S. [12 Wheaton] 19 (1827).
12
Joel Parker, The War Powers of Congress, and of the President, (Cambridge:
H.O. Houghton, 1863), 6, 32, 9-10, 57-59.
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civil law in that exigency, and this in consistency with, and not in
antagonism to, the Constitution.” Parker argued that the Constitution
provides a paramount right for the federal government to suppress
insurrection, but he refused to follow that argument to the logical end
that someone had to determine what was legitimate to operationalize that
right. Whiting contended that it was the president who could make such
a determination, but Parker loathed this argument because, as Phillip
Paludan observed, it “expanded power, diminished liberty, and glorified
both actions as justified by the Constitution.” Although Parker supported
the war, he loathed the dramatic expansions of power that came in its
wake. In his view, the war’s goal should have been simply to save the
Union in the name of stability and order. Lincoln’s assertion of executive
power, though ostensibly towards the same end of saving the Union,
threatened that stability and order.13
Former Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Curtis, who resigned
from the Court after he dissented from the Dred Scott decision, was more
charitable to Lincoln’s attempt to act within the bounds of the
Constitution, but, like Parker, Curtis thought the Emancipation
Proclamation was executive overreach. While Curtis acknowledged that
there may be exceptional cases that threaten public safety in which the
president may “justly look for indemnity” beyond the scope of the
enumerated powers, public safety was not threatened in this matter. As
such, the president was confined to his executive powers, which restrict
him to executing – not making, suspending, or altering – the laws. He
rejected the notion of implied powers justifying disregard for the limits
expressed in the Constitution. He wrote,
It must be obvious … that if the President of the United States has an
implied constitutional right, as commander-in-chief of the army and
13

Ex parte Merryman 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861); Parker, Habeas
Corpus and Martial Law, (Cambridge: Welch, Bigelow, and Company, 1861), 22;
Phillip Paludan, A Covenant with Death: The Constitution, Law, and Equality in the
Civil War Era, (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1975), 132, 146, 156,
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navy in time of war, to disregard any one positive prohibition of the
Constitution … because, in his judgment, he may thereby ‘best
subdue the enemy,’ he has the same right, for the same reason, to
disregard each and every provision of the constitution, and to
exercise all power, needful, in his opinion, to enable him ‘best to
subdue the enemy.’

In other words, Lincoln’s argument has no limiting principle to constrain
the president. The president’s commander-in-chief power, Curtis
concluded, must be exercised in subordination to the laws of the country,
from which alone he derives his authority.14
Members of Congress, too, argued that emancipation
transcended the president’s (or Congress’s) constitutional power.
Discussing a joint resolution that pledged support for gradual abolition
in March 1862, Crittenden argued that the Constitution contained a
natural right to self-preservation, but not to use any means in its pursuit.
Wholesale abolition, he argued, would go too far in infringing upon the
rights of states. In June, Samuel Cox, an Ohio Democrat, contended that
emancipation, particularly by executive fiat, violated the Constitution’s
ban on bills of attainder, its definition of treason (which is confined to
“levying war” against the United States), the takings clause, separation
of powers, and the right to a trial by jury. Finally, in December 1862, as
it was becoming clear Lincoln intended to follow through and issue the
proclamation, Unionist Congressman John Crisfield of Maryland argued
that allowing such an assertion of war power would be a slippery slope.
“Once admitted as a power belonging to this government,” he
argued, “[necessity] swallows up all other powers, and resolves
everything into the mere discretion of the individual who may
happen to wield its mighty energies. This is the definition of
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despotism.” Avoiding despotism undergirded most of the arguments
against the Emancipation Proclamation.15
Both Parker and Curtis had argued that the legislative branch had
sufficient power to suppress the rebellion at hand, which obviated the
need for any exercise of emergency powers anyway. In the years
preceding the Emancipation Proclamation, Congress had moved against
slavery only incrementally. Ignoring Taney’s decision in Dred Scott
under the premise that, because he had ultimately dismissed the case for
lack of standing, he could not make a substantive ruling on its merits,
Congress moved a legislative agenda that paved the way for blacks to
serve in militias, forbade military participation in recapture of fugitive
slaves, and banned slavery in federal territories and Washington D.C.
Perhaps most notably, Congress had also passed the Second
Confiscation Act. However, those measures largely exhausted its legal
authority to counteract slavery except for the possibility of appropriating
funds to support compensated emancipation in the border states,
something those states had rejected. Parker had argued that Congress
could have moved against sedition and conspiracy, but neither would
have materially affected the economy or politics of the South. As such,
it is not clear what options Congress had that would have been remotely
as effectual as the Emancipation Proclamation.16
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Congress’s inability to act further supports to Lincoln’s
argument of military exigencies compelling the commander-in-chief to
act using war powers. During the war, the courts largely yielded to
Lincoln’s assertions of those war powers. In United States v. Cashiel
(1863), which dealt with whether a civilian could be court martialed, the
District Court of Maryland ruled only on a procedural issue pertaining to
double jeopardy rather than weighing in on the extent of the federal
government’s war powers, which it acknowledged are “a problem of no
easy solution, but one which is now engaging the attention and careful
consideration of the statesmen and jurists of the land.” The court thus
constrained itself from ruling on a federal war power assertion. On two
occasions, federal courts upheld the Lincoln administration’s assertion
of war powers. In United States v. One Hundred and Twenty-Nine
Packages (1862), the Eastern District Court of Missouri cited the
Supreme Court’s 1849 ruling in Luther v. Borden as it acknowledged the
right of the political branches – Congress and the president – to
determine the nation’s state of peace or war and held that citizens and
civil courts are bound by that decision. In Elgee’s Adm’r v. Lovell (1865),
the Circuit Court of Missouri denied the right of a Louisianan to reclaim
cotton seized under the Confiscation Act of 1862 since, according to the
law of nations, “in time of war, an enemy cannot sue in the courts of the
country with which his nation is belligerent … all persons, citizens or
subjects of the nations thus at war, are themselves enemies each to the
other.”17
The only two unfavorable rulings in federal court pertaining
specifically to presidential assertions of war powers came in Ex parte
Merryman (1861) and Ex parte Benedict (1862). In the former, Chief
Justice Roger Taney issued a writ of habeas corpus and ordered General
17
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George Cadwalader to bring John Merryman, whom the Army had
arrested, before the court to hear the charges against him. Cadwalader
declined on the grounds that the Army had suspended the writ of habeas
corpus. In the ensuing legal opinion, Taney concluded that the
Constitution vests the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus only
in Congress and that neither the president nor the military could do so,
but the Lincoln administration declined to comply with Taney’s order.
The circumstances in Ex parte Benedict, a case arising from the Northern
District of New York, were similar, and the judge cited Taney’s ruling
to affirm that the president could not suspend the writ of habeas corpus.
However, the judge declined to hold the federal marshal in contempt for
disobeying the writ, perhaps a tacit acquiescence to the executive
branch’s prerogatives. Fehrenbacher observed that most legal scholars
would have agreed with Taney’s analysis, but that, in the intervening
years, few have faulted Lincoln for not complying with the writ. “[This]
does not mean that Lincoln condemned the institution of judicial
review,” Fehrenbacher wrote. “He did, however, reject the doctrine of
judicial supremacy.” In Lincoln’s eyes, the court did not have a
monopoly on constitutional interpretation, a job that ultimately rested
with the people.18
Ultimately, the Prize Cases (1863) had established that
conditions on the ground establish the presence of a war regardless of
any formal declaration and that, when those conditions were present, the
president “was bound to meet [belligerent force] in the shape it presented
itself,” using his powers as commander-in-chief to preserve, protect, and
defend the Constitution of the United States. In confronting the issue of
emancipation, Lincoln was measured and methodical as he sought first
to convince the border states to accept gradual, compensated
emancipation, then approved General Butler’s contraband policy, then,
18
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however grudgingly, signed the Confiscation Acts of 1861 and 1862,
and finally concluded that the conditions on the ground presented
themselves in such a shape that required the Emancipation Proclamation.
He had rejected the idea of emancipation in 1861, saying at the time,
“No, we must wait until every other means has been exhausted. This
thunderbolt will keep.” By July 1862, however, he determined the time
had come, and he made a good faith constitutional case that the president
had the power as commander-in-chief to subdue his enemy through
emancipation, which would, in the words of his John Nicolay, “destroy
the right arm of the rebellion.”19
Whether the courts would have upheld the Emancipation
Proclamation after the war is a hypothetical whose realization the 13th
Amendment obviated. Lincoln had signaled previously that he was
unsure, but, given that he justified the proclamation using war powers, it
seems unlikely such powers would endure when the war did not, which
explained Lincoln’s sense of urgency as he pushed Congress to pass a
constitutional amendment outlawing slavery. Nevertheless, Lincoln
appeared to have the fate of the proclamation on his mind when he
appointed his former Treasury Secretary Chase as the Supreme Court’s
Chief Justice upon Taney’s death in October 1864. “We want a man who
will sustain the Legal Tender Act and the Proclamation of
Emancipation,” Lincoln told George Boutwell. “We cannot ask a
candidate what he would do; and if we did and he should answer, we
should only despise him for it.” Lincoln thus implied that Chase’s views
on the subject were known and he would likely uphold the proclamation
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were it to reach the court prior to a constitutional amendment’s
ratification.20
Even if the court had struck down the proclamation after the war,
it seems that Lincoln would not have regretted issuing it because, in his
view, even if it was beyond the law’s enumerated power, the Union must
endure. “Are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted,” he asked, “and the
government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?” Such a line of
thinking has led some contemporary scholars to wonder whether, even
if the Emancipation Proclamation was unconstitutional, we should care.
Law professor Sanford Levinson delivered an address in 2001 asking
that very question. “Who cares,” he argued, “reflects an important
intellectual reality with regard to assessment of political actions: When
all is said and done, we place far greater emphasis on whether we
substantively like the outcomes, than on their legal pedigree.” Certainly,
though, Lincoln cared. His adversaries did too. In fact, Curtis was so
offended by a “leading and influential” Republican newspaper’s
declaration that “nobody cares” whether the proclamation is
constitutional that he devoted several pages of his pamphlet to defending
the rule of law and defended Lincoln, whom Curtis believed cared “that
he and all other public servants should obey the Constitution.” It is also
striking that Lincoln and Parker, though they vehemently differed on
prescription, largely agreed on principle: preservation of the Union must
be the paramount goal of not only the Civil War, but of the government
at large. The 13th Amendment, of course, ultimately sealed the fate of
emancipation. The Emancipation Proclamation, then, represented part of
the “slow, firm progress toward a revolutionary goal” that had long been
Lincoln’s modus operandi.21
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The Emancipation Proclamation stands as part of America’s
enduring quest to become a more perfect Union. Certainly, it was a
dramatic assertion of executive power, one that may even have
transcended the formalist bounds of the Constitution, and it is also true
that Lincoln’s legal argument defined no concrete limiting principle to
constrain future exercises of war powers. The ultimate limiting
principle, however, comes through the ongoing work of the people to
form that more perfect union. As Lincoln argued, it is citizens who are
the ultimate arbiters of what the Constitution means. Only the people
can decide – as they did in 1776 – that the existing form of government
is unacceptable, only the people can decide – as they did in 1787 – that
Union is worth forming, and only the people can decide – as they did
in 1861 – that such a Union is worth preserving. In executing that final
decision, Lincoln determined that the Emancipation Proclamation was
necessary. That such a decision had the consequence of bending
America towards the liberty imbued in the Declaration of
Independence is simply a testament to American virtue. Each great
decision in American history has, to some extent, been a gamble. It is
only through such gambles, though, that a nation conceived in and
dedicated to liberty, committed to the principle of government of the
people, by the people, and for the people, has been able to long endure.
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